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Jeffrey M. Colon**
Fordham University School of Law
The parties to a lawsuit often turn their attention to prejudgment interest only towards the
end of a long and drawn out process.  They are often weary, overextended (in terms of their
financial and other obligations) and in a rush to bring the matter to a conclusion.  Frequently,
they have not yet focused on the issue, and so they treat it as an after-thought.  That can be an
expensive mistake.  Because many jurisdictions grant courts wide discretion in calculating
prejudgment interest, the area provides lawyers and experts with the opportunity to provide
substantial value to their clients, as well as the possibility of costing them a lot of money.
1  Even in those states in which prejudgment interest is fixed by statute, attorneys and litigation experts can
still add value.  For example, if the statutory rate differs from the theoretically correct rate, the parties will have
incentives to alter their litigation strategies.
2  Post judgment interest is granted from the date of judgment until the date of payment.  Under federal law
post judgment interest is awarded at the fifty-two week Treasury bill rate.  28 U.S.C. § 1961.
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The first task of any lawyer or expert working on prejudgment interest should be to
ascertain how his  jurisdiction treats prejudgment interest.   In the United States, there is no
single set of rules for prejudgment interest.   Instead, different rules apply depending on the
jurisdiction whose law applies and perhaps the cause of action under which the plaintiff is
seeking to recover.  Many states have prescribed very simple rules.  For example, some states set
a fixed prejudgment interest rate by statute; others tie the rate to an established index.  See
Philips & Freeman (2003) for a survey across the states.  In these instances, about the only issue
left to contend is the length of the prejudgment period.1
Under federal law, however, the situation is very different.  There is no federally
mandated prejudgment interest rate or index.  Instead, federal courts have long recognized that
prejudgment interest is an element of complete compensation.  The court is supposed to grant
prejudgment interest in an  amount that will compensate the plaintiff for the defendant=s use of
its funds from the date of injury until the date of judgment.2  That is to say, prejudgment interest
should return the plaintiff to the position it would have been had the defendant compensated it
immediately after injuring it.  Courts and commentators have also pointed out that prejudgment
interest plays an important role in preventing defendants from being unjustly enriched.
By articulating a broad principle–making the plaintiff whole–the courts have left wide
open the debate over how to calculate prejudgment interest.  Although commentators have
3  The dispute arose out of a violation of the Arkansas River Compact.  The compact, negotiated by Kansas
and Colorado, and approved by Congress in 1949, provided that future development of the river=s basin could not
materially deplete the quantity of usable water available to downstream users.
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proposed a variety of different methodologies, the federal courts have not consistently adopted
any single approach.  Moreover, the Supreme Court=s most recent pronouncement, Kansas v.
Colorado, 533 U.S. 1 (2001), makes clear that lawyers and their experts have wide latitude in
persuading the court just how much prejudgment interest the defendant should pay in order to
make the plaintiff whole.3
The stakes are often high.  When the injury occurred long before the judgment,
prejudgment interest can greatly exceed the original judgment.  For example, Kansas, in its 1986
complaint against Colorado, sought $9 million in damages going back as far as 1950, plus $53
million in prejudgment interest.  In 1992, the Seventh Circuit awarded plaintiffs $65 million in
damages and $148 million in prejudgment interest in a suit arising out of the grounding of the
supertanker, Amoco Cadiz, off the coast of Brittany on March 16, 1978.
Even when the legal resolution occurs quickly, the interest can be large when the
judgment is large, especially when interest rates are high.  Moreover, because of compounding,
even small differences in interest rates can have large effects on the final award.  For example, in
Amoco Cadiz, a 1 percent increase in the interest rate (100 basis points) would have increased
the final award by $20 million.  For these reasons, the methods courts use to calculate
prejudgment interest have important practical significance.
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The rest of this Essay describes the basic principles that should apply in calculating
prejudgment interest and extends that analysis to cover a range of special circumstances that
frequently arise.   This Essay is not a survey of the case law or of the different positions
advanced by commentators.  Although we endeavor to discuss other methods where appropriate,
this Essay describes what we believe to be the proper method based on sound financial
principles.
X.1 THE PROBLEM.
Courts award prejudgment interest to place the parties in the same position they would
have been in had the defendant paid the plaintiff an amount equal to the original judgment when
the injury occurred.
Courts most often assess the final award by first calculating a multiplier (denoted by m),
which, when applied to the original judgment (J), produces the final judgment (FV):
                                         (1)
Thus, once it has decided liability and calculated the original judgment, the court's role in
assessing prejudgment interest reduces to setting the multiplier, m.
4  The formula assumes that prejudgment interest will be compounded.  Although interest in commercial
settings is always compounded, courts sometimes award prejudgment interest using simple interest, which is the
traditional common law rule.  Courts should, however, award compound prejudgment interest.
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          Courts commonly compute the multiplier as follows:
   
(2)
mwhere r  is the prejudgment interest rate, n is the number of compounding periods in a year, and
T is the prejudgment period in years.  Accordingly, setting the multiplier entails three tasks:
msetting the prejudgement interest rate (r ), calculating the prejudgment period (T), and
determining the frequency with which interest is compounded (n).4
X.2 WHICH INTEREST RATE?  DEFENDANT’S COST OF UNSECURED
BORROWING
Courts award prejudgment interest to place both the plaintiff and the defendant in the
same position that they would have been in had the defendant compensated the plaintiff
immediately after the injury.  In awarding prejudgment interest, courts typically describe their
task as looking for the interest rate that will compensate the plaintiff for delay.
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The paradigm employed throughout most of this Essay is a suit between two publicly
traded corporations with ready access to the capital markets.  We also assume that the
corporations’ investors hold diversified investment portfolios, and so tie up little of their wealth
in the litigating corporations.  In Section 7, we briefly discuss how to adjust the calculations
when the plaintiff is a close corporation or an individual.
The search for the appropriate interest rate begins by examining the plaintiff
corporation's balance sheet (using market, not book, values).  As a result of the defendant's
wrongdoing, the plaintiff either lost an asset or incurred an additional liability.  Either effect
would reduce the plaintiff's net worth.
The judicial system compensates the successful plaintiff with a monetary award, an asset. 
If the award were immediate (and costless to obtain), an award equal to the harm would exactly
offset the injury, leaving the plaintiff's net worth unchanged.  Because the plaintiff does not
receive an immediate judgment, the court awards prejudgment interest so that the present value
of the eventual judgment equals the present value of the harm.
The assumption that the parties have ready access to the capital markets now comes into
play.  We use the term judgment asset to mean the claim the plaintiff has against the defendant at
the time the defendant injures the plaintiff, later replaced with an award from the court.  The
court’s task is to set the return on the judgment asset that is appropriate for the risk, so that the
value of the judgment asset will equal that of the lost asset or offset the new liability.  As with
5  If the harm is H and the plaintiff’s probability of success at trial is p, then to compensate for the risk of
judicial error, the court should award a judgment, J, not of H, but of H/(1-p). 
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other assets, the value of a judgment asset to a plaintiff does not depend on the plaintiff's
characteristics, but rather on the judgment asset's risk and return.  There are two risks associated
with the judgment asset, only one of which should be compensated through prejudgment interest.
The first risk is that the courts will not uphold the plaintiff=s claim, or, even if they do,
they will not grant plaintiff a judgment that fully compensates for its injury.  Although this
problem and its solution–for the court to increase its judgment by dividing the harm by one
minus the probability of error–are both well-known in the law-and-economics literature, courts
do not compensate successful plaintiffs for the possibility that they might have erred.5 
Moreover, the risk of judicial error is conceptually outside of the realm of prejudgment interest;
it is more appropriately addressed before the calculation of prejudgment interest.  Accordingly, it
would be inappropriate to increase the prejudgment interest rate to reflect the risk of judicial
error.
The second risk is that the court will grant the plaintiff a judgment equal to its harm, but
that the plaintiff will not collect the judgment in full because the defendant goes bankrupt.  If
plaintiffs are not compensated for the risk of default, then plaintiffs as a class will be
undercompensated; each plaintiff will be undercompensated ex-ante (the judgment asset will be
worth less than the asset lost or liability imposed); and each defendant will be unjustly enriched
by the wrongdoing (and thus will have an incentive to engage in wrongdoing as a below-market-
cost method of raising capital).   Therefore, in order to put plaintiffs and defendants all back into
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their positions before the injury occurred, plaintiffs must be compensated for the risk that their
defendants will default.  Accordingly, the prejudgment interest rate should reflect the risk that
the defendant defaults. 
As with other debt, the risk that a plaintiff will not ultimately collect on its debt (the
judgment) does not depend on the plaintiff's assets, liabilities, or capital structure, but rather on
the defendant's risk of default.  The interest rate that reflects the risk that the defendant does not
pay its debts is the defendant's own borrowing rate.  In bankruptcy, courts treat legal claims
similar to unsecured debt.  Therefore, to compensate the plaintiff for delay, the court should 
award prejudgment interest at the defendant's unsecured borrowing rate.  Such an award will
allow the judgment asset to grow at the interest rate appropriate for the risk the plaintiff bears,
which is the risk that the defendant will default on the judgment.
The above approach to prejudgment interest is sometimes called the coerced loan theory. 
That phrase underscores the notion that the defendant, by not immediately compensating
plaintiff for its harm, has in effect forced the plaintiff to make a loan to defendant equal to
plaintiff’s harm.  Accordingly, compensating the plaintiff for waiting for repayment requires that
the court award prejudgment interest at the rate the defendant would pay a voluntary creditor on
an otherwise identical loan.
(a)  Alternative Rates Do Not Properly Compensate Plaintiffs
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The coerced loan theory has not been universally accepted.  Courts, litigants and
commentators have suggested awarding prejudgment interest at rates other than defendant’s cost
of unsecured borrowing.  The rates proposed include the return on plaintiff=s equity, the
plaintiff=s cost of capital, the plaintiff=s cost of debt, the return on a market index, and the risk-
free interest rate.  These proposals can be divided into three groups, depending on whether the
award of prejudgment interest is based on plaintiff’s return on investment, plaintiff’s cost of
raising funds, or at an interest rate that is independent of both plaintiff and defendant.
Return on Plaintiff=s Capital – Keir and Keir (1983) argue that the court should
assess prejudgment interest at the average return on plaintiff=s equity.  Their proffered rationale:
had the plaintiff collected the funds, it would have invested in its own business; therefore, the
return that the business has produced over time provides the best measure of the amount that the
plaintiff lost through delay.
The problem with this argument is that it ignores our assumption that the litigants
(especially the plaintiff) are two publicly traded companies with ready access to capital markets. 
Given that assumption, the defendant=s actions cannot plausibly be said to have prevented the
plaintiff from foregoing any attractive investment opportunities and thus to have missed out on
the resulting return.  If the plaintiff did not have the capital to pursue a desirable project, it could
have raised the funds through the capital market.
6  Keir and Keir (1983) argue that if a firm=s historical return is greater than its weighted average cost of
capital, the court should award prejudgment interest at the higher rate; otherwise, the court should award
prejudgment interest at the plaintiff’s cost of capital.
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The Plaintiff=s Cost of Capital – Keir and Keir (1983) also argue that the minimum
prejudgment interest rate is the plaintiff=s cost of capital, which for a firm with both debt and
equity, is its weighted average cost of capital.6  Awarding prejudgment interest at the plaintiff=s
cost of capital is intended to compensate plaintiff for the cost of tying up its capital.  The
rationale is that awarding prejudgment interest at the plaintiff’s cost of capital compensates the
plaintiff for the cost it incurred to raise the funds denied it by defendant’s wrongdoing.
The Plaintiff=s Cost of Borrowing – Closely related to the argument that prejudgment
interest should be awarded at the plaintiff=s cost of capital is the argument that it should be
awarded at the plaintiff=s cost of borrowing.  The rationale is that if the injury did not prevent the
plaintiff from undertaking any investment, then its most likely effect was to cause plaintiff to
increase its borrowing (because public firms rarely issue new equity, but they often borrow). 
Accordingly, in order to return plaintiff to its uninjured state, the defendant should pay interest to
the plaintiff at the plaintiff’s cost of borrowing additional funds.
Arguments that look at the plaintiff=s cost of raising funds (whether its cost of capital or
borrowing rate) have an obvious intuitive appeal, but they are also problematic.  In many cases,
there is no incremental borrowing.  In such cases, is there no cost from delay and therefore is no
award of prejudgment interest appropriate?  Obviously not.  Plaintiff is still harmed by waiting
and for incurring the risk that the defendant goes bankrupt.
7  Publicly traded firms rarely issue new equity, and so in the text we assume the plaintiff issues debt to
raise additional capital.  The logic, however, is the same if the plaintiff issues equity except that the return on equity
replaces that on debt.
8  We  assume that the plaintiff is certain to succeed on the merits and be granted a judgment (before
calculation of prejudgment interest) of a known amount.  As discussed elsewhere, prejudgment interest does not
compensate successful plaintiffs for their litigation costs or the possibility that they might have lost the case.
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If the plaintiff raises additional funds by issuing debt,7 then the interest rate plaintiff pays
for that new capital will reflect the risk borne by those new investors.  That risk depends on the
assets they can look towards for repayment and their priority.  Only in rare instances are the new
investors investing only in the claim.  When they are, the risks borne by the plaintiff are exactly
the same as those borne by the new investors and it is then appropriate to measure the cost to the
plaintiff of waiting by the interest rate plaintiff pays to it new investors to bear that risk.8
In contrast, when the new investors do not look solely to the claim for repayment, then
the risk they bear and hence the interest rate plaintiff pays will not reflect the harm caused to
plaintiff by delay.  In these circumstances, the interest rate plaintiff pays the new investors will
reflect their position in plaintiff=s capital structure.  If the interest rate plaintiff pays its new
investors is higher than defendant=s unsecured borrowing rate, it is because the plaintiff=s new 
investors are not only assuming the defendant’s default risk, but other additional risks as well,
for which they demand compensation in the form of a higher interest rate.  The defendant should
not have to compensate plaintiff for risks unrelated to the litigation that are being  transferred to
new investors.  Alternatively, if the interest rate that plaintiff is paying to outside investors is
lower than defendant=s cost of unsecured borrowing, then the new investors are not assuming
defendant’s entire default risk, but instead plaintiff is retaining some of the risk of defendant=s
9  In appraisal cases, the Delaware courts award prejudgment interest in appraisal cases based on an equal
weighting of the defendant=s cost of borrowing and the return on a Aprudent investor@ portfolio consisting of a
diversified portfolio of stocks, money market instruments, and a bond portfolio.  Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow
Publishers, Inc., 2002 Del. Ch. Lexis 105.
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default.  The court should not fail to compensate plaintiff for the risk it bears due to defendant’s
wrongdoing because it raised additional capital without transferring all of that risk to its new
investors.
The Return on a Market Index B Plaintiffs sometimes seek to receive prejudgment
interest at the rate that they would have earned had they received the money earlier and invested
it in a diversified portfolio of stocks.  The logic is that the plaintiff could have distributed the
money to its shareholders, who would have reinvested it.  The return on the market portfolio is a
reasonable market-based return for a diversified investor.  For example, in appraisal cases, the
Delaware Court of Chancery awards prejudgment interest based in part on the return that
plaintiff could have earned on a diversified portfolio of stocks.9
There are several problems with this argument.  First, in the context of litigation between
two publicly traded companies, the defendant’s actions do not prevent the plaintiff’s
shareholders from cashing out their stock and investing in a diversified portfolio.  They can sell
their stock and invest their proceeds as they please.  They can also adjust their other investments
if they want to increase or decrease their risk exposure.
Second, the return on a diversified portfolio of stocks reflects the risk of that portfolio. 
That, however, is not the investment that plaintiff has made (albeit involuntarily) with the funds
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held by the defendant.  Instead, the plaintiff has, in effect, invested them in the defendant's
unsecured debt and should receive a corresponding risk-adjusted return.  Giving the plaintiff a
different return, based on the risk of a diversified portfolio of stocks, does not compensate the
plaintiff for the risk it bore through its forced investment in the defendant.
Risk-Free Rate  B Fischer & Romaine (1990) argue that the court should award
prejudgment interest at the U.S. Treasury bill rateCthe interest rate that the federal government
pays when it borrows.  Their proffered rationale is that U.S. courts do not compensate plaintiffs
for the risks of litigation and the possibility of defendant going bankrupt is a risk of litigation. 
Weil (1995) has two responses to that argument.  First, Fisher and Romaine=s argument–that
plaintiffs should not be compensated for litigation costs–does not imply that prejudgment
interest should be awarded at the risk-free rate.  Instead, because delay (apart from the risk of
default) is also a cost of litigation, the logic of Fisher and Romaine’s argument implies that
courts should never award prejudgment interest, not that they should award prejudgment interest
at the risk-free rate.  Since that result is in conflict with statutory law, case law and the logic
behind prejudgment interest, the argument upon which it rests should be rejected.  Second,
awarding prejudgment interest at a fixed or variable rate that is independent of defendant=s cost
of unsecured debt (such as the risk-free rate), will encourage defendant’s to increase their risk. 
The defendant, through its choice of investments, has some control of its bankruptcy risk.  If the
prejudgment interest rate does not reflect that risk, the defendant, by increasing that risk, will be
able to shift some portion of the costs of risky undertakings to the plaintiff.  That would appear
to be an unnecessary and undesirable feature of a judicial system.
10  This conclusion is consistent with the financial economist=s view that the payoff to a long party of a
forward contractC the party purchasing the asset, who, in the litigation setting is the defendantC is economically
identical to a fully levered position in the underlying asset.  Since the leverage is the obligation of the long party
(defendant), it is only the long party=s (defendant=s) default risk that is relevant.
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(b) Recent Criticisms of the Coerced Loan Theory are Unpersuasive
In the last couple of years, several commentators have criticized the coerced loan theory
and the proposal to award prejudgment interest at defendant=s unsecured borrowing rate.  We
discuss two such commentators next.
Escher and Krueger (2003) employ a cost-of-carry pricing model.  They argue that the
plaintiff=s claim for damages or lost profits (i.e., the judgment asset) is in essence a forward
contract that is traded at the time of the harm.  The forward contract entitles the plaintiff to
receive an amount in the future when the judgment is rendered.  The delivery price of such a
contract–the amount to be exchanged in the future–is simply today=s price (i.e., the harm
incurred by plaintiff) plus the cost of carry.  In their model, the cost of carry is the plaintiff=s
Aimplied financing cost@ or cost of debt capital.  Escher and Krueger=s cost-of-carry approach is
insightful, but rather than undercutting the coerced loan theory, it supports it.  In the absence of
default risk, the delivery price of a forward contract is the spot (or today=s) price plus the risk-
free rate.  As Escher and Krueger note, however, if there is default risk, the difference between
the spot price and delivery price should reflect that risk.  In the litigation context, because only
the defendant can default, only the defendant=s default risk matters.  Thus, the cost of carry
model leads back to awarding prejudgment interest at the defendant=s cost of unsecured debt.10
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Barondes (2005) takes a different tack.  He argues that the coerced loan theory fails to
distinguish between the plaintiff’s equityholders and creditors.  Drawing on the idea of asset
substitution in corporate finance (Jensen & Meckling (1976)), Barondes notes that the judgment
asset, even if it has the same present value as the asset plaintiff lost (or liability it incurred) will
likely have different risk characteristics.  Substituting a riskier asset for an asset with the same
present value will usually transfer value from plaintiff’s debtholders to equityholders, and
conversely.  As a result, awarding prejudgment interest at defendant’s cost of unsecured
borrowing will not restore plaintiff=s equityholders and debtholders positions before the injury. 
If the judgment asset is riskier than the asset it replaces, equityholders will typically gain at the
expense of debtholders, and conversely.  The possibility of such a transfer, however, does not
provide a basis for rejecting the coerced loan theory.  That is because modern finance rejects the
view, implicit in Barondes’ argument, that equityholders are the firm’s owners and debtholders
are mere lenders.  Rather, in the contemporary view, debt and equity are alternative methods of
financing a firm, and it is the firm’s investors who are injured.  Accordingly, awarding
prejudgment interest at the defendant=s unsecured borrowing rate will allow debtholders and
equityholders taken together to be fully compensated for the risk of the judgment asset without
being overcompensated.  Using any other interest rate to calculate the final award will either
overcompensate or undercompensate some investors in plaintiff.
11  Obviously, the court should not allow either party to select the method at the end of litigation.  That
would give either party a valuable option that would encourage it to delay.
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X.3 PREJUDGMENT INTEREST SHOULD BE AWARDED AT A FLOATING
INTEREST RATE.
Interest rates usually vary with the duration of an investment.  The observed pattern of
interest rates from now to various future times is called the term structure of interest rates. 
Typically, long-term rates exceed short-term rates, producing an upward-sloping term structure.
When, as is normal, the term structure is not flat, the court must decide whether to use a
series of short-term rates or a single long-tern rate.  Consider, for example, a plaintiff who
suffers an injury on January 1, 1996, and receives payment on January 1, 2006.  The court,
looking backward from the year 2006, might apply the ten-year rate for debt issued by the
defendant in 1996 maturing in 2006, or it might apply a series of ten one-year rates–one for
1996, one for 1997, and so on, through 2006.  Because the term structure is not usually flat and
because it shifts over time, these two choices will give different answers.  Typically, but not
invariably, the single ten-year rate will exceed the rate compounded from ten one-year rates. 
Should the court use the ten-year rate or the rate compounded from ten one-year rates?  Finance
does not provide an answer because either method (if selected ex ante11) would compensate the
plaintiff.  Knoll (1996), however. argues that the need of the court system to encourage parties to
settle their disputes favors using short-term interest rates.
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If courts used  long-term interest rates, they would interfere with the parties' incentives to
settle.  If interest rates rise during litigation, defendants will be borrowing at below-market
interest rates, which will give them an incentive to prolong litigation.  Falling interest rates
reverse the incentives.  Thus, although one party=s incentive to delay is matched by the other
party=s incentive to expedite, it is easier for one party acting unilaterally to delay litigation than
to expedite it.  In contrast, short term rates give neither party an advantage or disadvantage from
delay and thus encourage settlement relative to using long-term rates.
The upward-sloping term structure reflects the increasing interest rate risk from fixing an
interest rate at the start of ever-longer loans.  Because courts set prejudgment interest ex post,
after the events have occurred and all interest rates are known for all past periods, the investor
(the plaintiff) bears no risk that those past interest rates will change.  Accordingly, courts should
calculate prejudgment interest using a series of short-term rates, short enough not to include a
premium for interest rate risk.  This implies computing prejudgment interest based on floating,
variable, or adjustable rates, not on fixed rates.
Losey, Mass and Li (2002) disagree.  They argue that short-term interest rates will
neither discourage foot dragging nor compensate plaintiffs.  Instead, they propose that courts
should award prejudgment interest at a variable rate with a term premium.  That premium serves
two functions: compensation for the risk of default and for tying up capital.  To the extent that
the premium compensates for the risk of default, that issue is discussed below.  Here, we discuss
only compensation for extending credit for a period of time.
12  That is not to say that there is no cost to plaintiff from tying up the money or more accurately that the
market does not pay a premium for tying up capital.   However, such a premium, if it exists, is not given by the yield
curve premium.
18
The standard explanation for the persistence of the upward sloping interest term structure
is that borrowers have longer time horizons than lenders.  Accordingly, in order to induce
borrowers to invest their capital for a long period, borrowers must receive a premium.  It is
important to distinguish between a term premium and a liquidity premium.  Holders of long-term
federal government securities, however, do not have to tie up their money.  That is because the
market for such securities is highly liquid.  The holder of a one-year bond can get his money in
one year; the holder of a ten-year bond can also get her money in one year, by selling her bond. 
The latter however is subject to more risk because the price she gets for her bond will depend on
the 9-year interest rate in one year.  The term premium reflects this risk, which can be avoided
by granting prejudgment interest at a variable or floating interest rate.12
X.4 ESTIMATING DEFENDANT’S UNSECURED FLOATING BORROWING RATE
According to the coerced loan theory, the court should award prejudgment interest at the
interest rate the defendant would pay on an otherwise equivalent voluntary loan.  Because the
judgment is treated on par with unsecured creditors in bankruptcy, prejudgment interest should
be granted at the interest rate the defendant would pay for unsecured debt in order to compensate
the plaintiff for the risk of default.  In order to avoid the possibility of having both a large winner
and a large loser when interest rates change, prejudgment interest should be granted at a floating
or variable interest rate.
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Courts have several methods available to them to estimate the interest rate that the
defendant would pay on an otherwise identical voluntary loan.  We discuss three relatively
simple to implement methods here.  They all yield approximations.  Although none of the
methods will yield a precise, theoretically correct answer, they will produce credible results
when done with some care.
The coerced loan theory says that prejudgment interest should be awarded at the interest
rate defendant pays for unsecured borrowing.  In order to compensate the plaintiff for the risk of
nonpayment the prejudgment interest rate should reflect the risk to the plaintiff that the
defendant will default.  The most obvious proxy is a floating interest rate at which the defendant
can or is borrowing unsecured.   For companies that can borrow large sums from banks without
security, the prime rate is an obvious proxy.
Second, many large companies have access to and regularly borrow through the
commercial paper market.  Commercial paper is short-term, unsecured promissory notes. 
Because the commercial paper market is more restrictive than the market for bank loans at
prime, the interest rate on commercial paper is regularly 200 to 300 basis points below the prime
rate.  As a result, only the most creditworthy borrowers can issue commercial paper.
Losey, Mass and Li (2002) take issue with awarding prejudgment interest at the
defendant’s commercial paper rate.  They argue that the short-term commercial paper rate does
not compensate plaintiff for the risk that the defendant will go bankrupt before the judgment can
13If a defendant has outstanding long-term variable interest rate debt, the rate on the that debt could be used
provided that adjustments are made for the value of any put and call provisions held by the holder or issuer.
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be enforced.  That is because the risk of bankruptcy increases with the horizon, and most
plaintiffs have been forced into making a long-term loan (perhaps many years in duration) to the
defendant, whereas the holders of commercial paper typically make loans for a year or less.
Accordingly, to compensate for this risk, it may be appropriate to use the defendant’s
long-term variable interest rate.  Because a defendant may not have any long-term variable
interest rate debt outstanding, a court may have to estimate what that rate would be
using the bond-rating services rating of the corporation's unsecured long-term debt and
information on the risk premium for long-term debt of that same rating.13  Financial services,
such as Bloomberg, publish yield curves for corporate debt with different ratings from the credit
agencies.  They also calculate the yield premium relative to Treasury securities.  The premium
not over short-term rates, but relative to Treasury securities with the same maturity will reflect
the additional credit risk with corporate securities.  That information can be used to estimate the
appropriate prejudgment interest rate.
X.5 COMPLETING THE MULTIPLIER.
The previous sections discussed how the court should select the prejudgment interest
rate.  Setting the multiplier requires that the court also determine the length of the prejudgment
period (T) and the choice of compounding period (n).  It is to these issues that we now turn.
14  The prejudgment period ends when the court issues its judgment.  Frequently, because of appeals,
collateral litigation, and the possibly delays in collection, the plaintiff is not paid until later.  The period from
judgment to payment is the postjudgment period.
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(a) The Prejudgment Period.  
The courts second task is to calculate the length of the prejudgment period.  That period
ends at the award date.14  That leaves two open issues: when to begin the prejudgment period
and whether to deny interest for a portion of the prejudgment period.  To aid in our discussion,
consider the following dates (terminology adapted from Weil):  incident date, harm date, filing
date, and award date.  
Consider first when the court should begin the prejudgment period.  Jurisdictions split
between those that begin to accrue interest from the harm date (usually, but not necessarily, the
incident date) and those that wait until the filing date.  The recognition that prejudgment interest
compensates for the defendant's possession of funds that rightfully belong to the plaintiff favors
using the harm date.  That will place the plaintiff in the same position as if the defendant had
immediately paid the plaintiff, which is the purpose served by prejudgment interest.
Courts sometimes deny interest to plaintiffs who have unduly delayed the filing date
under the doctrine of laches.  Denying plaintiffs compensation for harm they themselves caused
by waiting might be a suitable reaction if the court awards prejudgment interest at a rate higher
than the defendant's unsecured debt rate.  If, however, the court sets the rate correctly, then not
commencing the accrual of interest at the date of harm fails to compensate the plaintiff fully and
undercharges the defendant.  Even if the plaintiff has unduly delayed, the defendant is not
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penalized by accruing interest over the entire prejudgment period.  The defendant will break
even, having held the funds during the delay period, for which the court charges it at its normal
borrowing rate for such funds.
(b) Choice of Compounding Period.
The courts last task in setting the multiplier is to select the compounding period–an issue
that the parties and the courts frequently overlook.  All interest rates explicitly or implicitly
assume a compounding period.  Consider a stated annual interest rate of 12 percent.  With a
compounding period of one year, the effective annual rate equals 12 percent.  If, however, the
compounding period is the calendar quarter, implying a rate of 3 (= 12/4) percent per quarter, the
effective annual rate is 12.55 (= 1.03  - 1) percent.  If the compounding period is one month,4
implying a rate of 1 (= 12/12) percent per month, the effective annual rate is 12.68 (=1.01  - 1)12
percent.
The effects of the choice of compounding period on the award can be substantial.  The
defendant pays dollars, not percentages.  For example, the Amoco Cadiz court awarded interest
at the prime rate compounded yearly.  The court did not take into account the practice that prime
rate loans typically call for quarterly interest compounding.  Knoll (1996) estimates that
adjusting the interest rate calculation for the more frequent compounding that the quoted rate
presumes would have increased the interest component of the award by about $11 million.
15  Implicit taxes (in the form of lower expected rates of return) on some investments, such as municipal
bonds, are taxes for this purpose.
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X.6 OTHER ISSUES IN THE CALCULATION OF PREJUDGMENT INTEREST  
This section discusses several additional issues in the calculation of prejudgment interest:
taxes; multiple defendants; the relation between prejudgment interest and currency conversion;
and injuries that produce harms at a later date.
(a) Adjusting the Multiplier for Taxes
The discussion so far has ignored income taxes.  In order to ensure that the award
compensates plaintiff without being overly generous, the court should adjust its calculation for
taxes.  That is because the tax treatment of prejudgment interest generally does not mirror the tax
treatment of corporate bond interest.
The interest earned on bonds is taxed as it accrues.  In contrast, even accrual method
plaintiffs do not pay tax on prejudgment interest until the award date.  Compared to receiving
compensation immediately at the time of harm and investing the proceeds in taxable bonds, the
plaintiff has been able to defer its tax payments on its interest earnings to the award date.  To
adjust for the benefit of deferral, the court should compound prejudgment interest at the product
of defendant’s cost of unsecured borrowing and one minus the plaintiff’s tax rate over the
prejudgment period,15 and then gross up that after-tax amount by dividing by one minus
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plaintiff’s tax rate on the award date.  When the court takes into account the tax on prejudgment
ATinterest, the multiplier, denoted by m , becomes:
(3)
m i i iTwhere t  is the tax rate in year T and r  is the mean after-tax interest rate, with r  = r  (1 - t ).
AT AT
The court might also need to adjust the multiplier to reflect the tax treatment of the
original judgment.  Equations (2) and (3) implicitly assume that the plaintiff would not have paid
any taxes if the defendant had immediately compensated the plaintiffs, and so the plaintiff could
have invested the entire payment.  If, however, the plaintiff would have had to pay taxes on any
payment received from the defendant, then the plaintiff would have ben able to invest only the
after-tax amount, and so would not have earned as much interest.  Accordingly, when the
AT  original judgment is taxable, the multiplier, now denoted by m' is
(4)
16  In the latter circumstance, no deduction is generally allowed while the case is in litigation.
17  Equations (3) and (4) both include the plaintiff=s tax rate.  That rate should be the plaintiff=s marginal
tax rate on the amount at issue.  That rate will often differ from the effective tax rate that is reported in the plaintiff=s
financial reports (Scholes et al. (2005)).  The appropriate rate is also effected by the tax planning strategies available
to plaintiff (Weil (1995)).
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T oMwhere t  and r  are as defined in equation (3) and t  is the tax rate at the time of injury. 
AT
Multipliers calculated using equation (3) will usually exceed those calculated using equation (4).
Which multiplier the court should use depends upon plaintiff’s tax status and the
taxability of the award.  If plaintiff is exempt from tax, the court should use equation (2).  If the
plaintiff is subject to tax on taxable interest income, the court should use either equation (3) or
equation (4).  If the award is also taxable, then equation (4) gives the correct multiplier.  On the
other hand, if the award is not taxable, then equation (3) gives the correct multiplier.  In general,
the award is taxable it if it compensates the plaintiff for lost income, but not if it compensates for
an otherwise deductible loss.16  For example, assume a contract case in which the court awards
the plaintiff expectancy damages of $1 million–$600,000 as compensation for expenses incurred
and $400,000 for anticipated profit.  Then, the court should assess prejudgment interest on
$600,000 using equation (3)–because that portion of the payment is in effect untaxed assuming
that the deduction was suspended until payment–and on the remaining $400,000 using equation
(4)–because that portion of the payment is taxed.17
In at least two cases, Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl.  481 (1994), aff’d,
86 F.3d 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1996) and Cement Division, National Gypsum Co. v. Milwaukee, 950 F.
Supp. 904, aff’d, 144 F.3d 1111 (7  Cir. 1998), defendants argued that the court should adjustth
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the multiplier for the deferral of taxes.  In neither case, did the court adjust the multiplier for
taxes.  In Cement Division, however, the district court, to which defendant had submitted a
working paper version of Knoll (1996), stated that the proposed adjustment Awould result in a
more accurate calculation.@  Nonetheless, it declined to do so, noting that the record did not
contain sufficient information about plaintiff=s income or taxes to calculate the adjustment and
that no other court had previously done so.
(b) Multiple Defendants.  
In many cases, the plaintiff can collect its judgment, if at all, only from the defendant.  In
such cases, awarding prejudgment interest at defendant’s cost of unsecured debt compensates
plaintiff for the risk of default.  In other cases, however, the defendant can collect from more
than one source.  When the plaintiff can recover from more than one party, the court should take
this possibility into account in setting the prejudgment interest rate.  In general, because the
opportunity to look towards multiple sources increases the likelihood of recovery, it should
reduce the prejudgment interest rate.
For example, when the court finds several defendants jointly and severally liable, a
successful plaintiff will fail to collect the full judgment only if all liable defendants default. 
Because the plaintiff will collect the entire judgment if any defendant is solvent, the plaintiff
should be awarded prejudgment interest at the market interest rate for an unsecured loan jointly
made to (or guaranteed by) all the liable defendants.  The interest rate for such a loan cannot
exceed–and will usually be less than–the rate paid by the most creditworthy defendant.
18  Parent-subsidiary liability has the potential to create a strategic issue because a defendant whose
subsidiary is sufficiently solvent to pay the judgment has an incentive to concede the parent=s responsibility
assuming the subsidiary is liable at the end of the process in an attempt to keep the prejudgment interest rate down.
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When the defendant carries insurance, the successful plaintiff can then look both to the
defendant and to its insurance company for recovery.  When the plaintiff is covered by insurance
that the defendant had in place on the injury date, the plaintiff will recover if either the defendant
or its insurer is solvent.  In such circumstances, prejudgment interest should not exceed the lesser
of the defendant's and its insurance carrier's unsecured borrowing rate.
This issue also arises when the defendant is part of an affiliated group of companies. 
Under such circumstances, a dispute can arise as to which companies within the group can be
forced to pay the judgment if the defendant cannot.  For example, a wholly owned subsidiary of
Amoco operated the supertanker Amoco Cadiz.  If the court finds the subsidiary liable but not the
parent, the plaintiffs could look to only the subsidiary's assets to satisfy a judgment.  Although
the plaintiffs would ex ante be less likely to collect their judgment, they should receive
compensation for this additional risk through a higher prejudgment interest rate based on the
subsidiary's unsecured borrowing rate only, unprotected by the parent.  Accordingly, the court
should base the interest rate on the default risk of the subsidiary, or group of companies, whose
assets defendants can reach to satisfy its judgment.18
(c) Currency Conversion.
19  The possibility of arbitrage will ensure that the two techniques will yield the same final judgment using
long-term interest rates over the entire prejudgment period in both markets and the forward foreign currency-dollar
exchange rate as of the date of harm.  This equivalence however does not hold for shorter-term interest rate and spot
exchange rates.
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Regardless of where an injury occurs and the currency in which the harm is originally
denominated, U.S. courts usually grant the final award in dollars.  Thus, when the harm is not
originally denominated in dollars, setting the final judgment requires two steps: converting the
award into dollars and calculating prejudgment interest.
            The court can calculate the final judgment in two ways.  First, it can convert the original
award to dollars using the exchange rate at harm date and then calculate prejudgment interest
using the defendant's unsecured borrowing rate for dollar-denominated loans.  Alternatively, a
court can calculate prejudgment interest using the defendant's unsecured borrowing rate in the
currency in which the harm occurred and then convert the award to dollars using the exchange
rate at the judgment date.
The order in which the court performs those two steps matters.  Using actual interest
rates and exchange rates, the two techniques usually produce different results.  That is because
exchange rates and interest rates move over time in ways that are not completely anticipated. 
The wider the fluctuations, the greater the difference in results.19  Accordingly, the sequence in
which the calculations are made matters.  Neither sequence is wrong.  However, neither party
should be permitted to choose the method it prefers at the end of litigation.  That party would
obviously choose the method that was more advantageous to it.  Instead, courts should develop a
consistent methodology.
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A simple rule would be for courts to follow the current jurisprudence on exchange rate
conversions.  The prevailing approach is to look at the jurisdiction in which plaintiff=s cause of
action arose to determine when to convert the award into dollars.  Only when the plaintiff=s cause
of action arises entirely under foreign law is the judgment converted on the judgment date.  If,
however, the plaintiff has a claim arising under U.S. law, the judgment will be converted into
U.S. dollars as of the harm date.  As long as the approach used by the court is determinative
early in the process, there will be little opportunity for strategic action.
(d) Payments for Subsequent Harms.
The discussion so far has dealt with harms that occur at a single date or over a short
period of time around the time of the injury.  Thus, for example, in Amoco Cadiz, the harm was
the cost of cleaning up the beaches and waterways damaged by the oil spill.  Barondes (2005)
has shown that there is a risk of double counting when the harm occurs subsequently.  In such
circumstances, the appropriate response is usually to discount the subsequent harm back to the
date of injury (using an interest rate appropriate for the project) and then to calculate
prejudgment interest on that amount until the judgment date.   This will produce a different result
than just bringing the harm to the judgment date whenever the discount rate on the project differs
from the prejudgment interest rate.  See Weil (2003).
Consider the following example.  An oil spill occurs on January 1, 1996, and the final
judgment is rendered on January 1, 2006.  A portion of the judgment covers the harm from the
20  If the plaintiff is a publicly traded corporation and the defendant an individual or small business, then a
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lost fish catch in 1999 (assumed to incur on January 1, 1999 to keep the arithmetic simple). 
Since the judgment is rendered on January 1, 2006, the payment must be brought to that date. 
That can be done in either one of two ways.  Prejudgment interest can be calculated from 1999 to
2006, a period of 7 years.  Alternatively, the value of the lost catch can be discounted from 1999
back to 1996, a period of 3 years, and prejudgment interest then calculated from 1996 to 2006, a
period of 10 years.  
Which approach the court should use depends on the nature of the injury.  If the lost fish
catch in 1999 was a result of the 1996 oil spill and was unlikely to be remedied by subsequent
remedial actions, then as of 1996 the plaintiff had to look towards the defendant for the lost
catch in 1999.  Accordingly, the court should discount the value of the catch back to 1996 and
then calculate prejudgment interest until 2006.  Alternatively, if the defendant could have
remedied the harm by taking reasonable steps at remediation, but it still failed to remedy the
harm, then the plaintiff=s injury can be traced to 1999.  Accordingly, prejudgment interest should
be awarded for 7 years, from 1999 through 2006.
X.7 CLOSE CORPORATIONS AND INDIVIDUAL PLAINTIFFS
The analysis and conclusions given above must be modified if the plaintiff is an
individual or small business.  In such cases, the defendant=s unsecured borrowing rate will not be
the appropriate rate in all cases.20
court should still award prejudgment interest using the defendant=s unsecured borrowing rate.  The plaintiff has made
a forced loan to the defendant and must be compensated for the risk that the defendant won=t pay any final judgment. 
Unlike the case of corporate defendants, there is no readily available interest rate a court could look to in order to set
the appropriate prejudgment interest rate.  Home mortgage and car loan rates are not appropriate benchmarks
because such loans are secured.  The rate on credit card debt is probably better because it is unsecured.  Credit cards
rates, however, vary greatly and are relatively high.  If this benchmark is used, the defendant would greatly benefit
by being able to show that he or she would be eligible for a rate on the low end of the range.  As described above, to
the extent that a judgment was covered by insurance, the insurance company=s unsecured borrowing rate would be
the appropriate rate.
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The argument for awarding prejudgment interest at the defendant=s unsecured borrowing
rate was based on two key premises.  The first premiseBthat the plaintiff had ready access to the
capital marketsBensured that the defendant=s actions would not prevent the plaintiff from making
any desirable investments.  This took away the argument that the plaintiff should be
compensated for a missed opportunity.  The second premiseBthat investors in the plaintiff had
little of their wealth tied up in the plaintiff and held diversified investment portfoliosBensured
that they would value the claim in the same manner as would the market.  This implied that they
require compensation for the risk associated with the claim in exactly the amount that the market
would pay if the claim were a separately traded asset.  Together, the two premises directly led to
the conclusion that awarding prejudgment interest at the defendant=s cost of unsecured debt
would compensate plaintiff (and its investors) for the delay in receiving judgment.
For close corporations and individuals, the two premises might not hold.  Specifically,
when the claim is large relative to the plaintiff=s wealth, the premises are likely to be violated.  In
those circumstances, it is possible that the plaintiff was prevented from making a desirable
investment (or at least the cost of such investment was increased), forced to change his or her
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consumption, and that the plaintiff does not value the claim in the same way as would the
market.  
The unsecured borrowing rates of publicly traded corporations are set in the marketplace
by the buying and selling actions of diversified investors.  The equilibrium market rate, and in
particular, the excess of the promised rate over the risk-free rate, will reflect the expected default
loss and, to extent the marginal investor is risk adverse, an additional premium over the risk-free
rate.  
If the plaintiff=s claim is large relative to his or her wealth, the forced loan to defendant
would cause plaintiff to hold an undiversified portfolio and bear unsystematic risk that is not
priced into the defendant=s borrowing rate.  Thus, receiving the defendant=s unsecured borrowing
rate would under compensate the plaintiff.  In theory, to properly adjust this rate, a court would
need to determine the plaintiff=s subjective degree of risk aversion.  The plaintiff, of course,
would have a great incentive to exaggerate his or her degree of risk aversion.
In addition, the delay in receiving the judgment proceeds and interest may prevent an
individual from exercising his or her optimal consumption during litigation.  Although it may be
proper to adjust the rate to reflect the plaintiff=s diminished utility, the precise mechanism for
doing so is unclear as it necessarily depends on subjective information from the plaintiff.
X.8 CONCLUSION
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This Essay has set forth the appropriate method for assessing prejudgment interest in
litigation and has demonstrated how to apply the rate in different situations.  We argue that in
suits between two parties with ready access to the capital markets, prejudgment interest should
be calculated using the defendant=s unsecured, short-term borrowing rate with possible
adjustment for the risk that the defendant will default.  If done well, such an award will
compensate the successful plaintiff for the delay in receiving payment and for the risk that the
defendant will go bankrupt before the plaintiff can collect.  It will also prevent the defendant
from being unjustly enriched without further penalizing the defendant.  Further, by calculating
prejudgment interest at a floating rate over the prejudgment period instead of at a fixed, long-
term interest rate at the start of the period, the court can eliminate the risk of interest rate
changes.
There are many benefits to using the defendant=s unsecured, floating borrowing rate. 
Once litigation has begun, judicial resources are economized because neither party has an
incentive to unnecessarily delay litigation.  Prior to litigation, because defendants who are found
liable must pay and successful plaintiffs will receive complete economic compensation for
damages, both parties will have the proper economic incentives to take the correct amount of
care, thereby improving efficiency.
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